



Moving Towards the Future: The 















Professional Report submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Urban and Regional Planning 
Department of Planning, Policy, and Design 
University of California, Irvine 
 
CLIENT: Ben Ku, Orange County Transportation Authority 
PR FACULTY ADVISOR: Marlon Boarnet 
DATE: 4/19/2010 2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ----------------------------------------------------- 2 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ---------------------------------------- 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY --------------------------------------------------- 6 
INTRODUCTION  -------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
PROBLEM STATEMENT----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  10 
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT  ----------------------- 11 
PURPOSE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  11 
NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  11 
GROWTH IN POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------  12 
GROWTH IN TRAVEL DEMAND ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  13 
CAPACITY OF CURRENT INTERCITY AIR AND RAIL TRAVEL --------------------------------------------------  13 
OBJECTIVES ------------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
METHODOLOGY ------------------------------------------------------------ 17 
BACKGROUND  --------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
U.S. HIGH SPEED RAIL  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  19 
CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL AUTHORITY-------------------------------------------------------------------  22 
ANAHEIM TO LOS ANGELES SEGMENT --------------------------------------------------------------------------  23 
Existing Rail Service in California  ----------------------------------------- 27 
INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  27 
COMMUTER RAIL ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  28 
FREIGHT SERVICE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  28 
ISSUES OF MEASUREMENT -------------------------------------------- 29 
TRAVEL CHOICE MODELS -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  31 
RAIL RIDERSHIP COMPARISON------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  31 3 
 
AIR RIDERSHIP COMPARISON -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  34 
CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL PROJECTED RIDERSHIP -----------------------------------------------------  37 
REVIVED FLORIDA HIGH SPEED RAIL PROJECT  --------------- 40 
BACKGROUND --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  40 
ANALYSIS  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  41 
LESSONS LEARNED --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  42 
FUTURE OF HSR IN FLORIDA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  42 
ACELA CASE STUDY ------------------------------------------------------ 43 
OVERVIEW ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  44 
ACELA EXPRESS ANALYSIS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  44 
SUCCESSES ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  47 
FAILURES  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  48 
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED RAIL ------------------- 50 
EU’S VISION FOR HIGH SPEED AIL -------------------------------------------------------------------------------  50 
EUROPEAN UNION HIGH SPEED RAIL POLICY -----------------------------------------------------------------  51 
THE GERMAN INTERCITY EXPRESS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------  52 
URBAN FORM CHARACTERISTICS --------------------------------------------------------------------------------  53 
TRANSIT QUALITY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  54 
TRAVEL BEHAVIOR  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  55 
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE -----------------------------------------  55 
FUNDING SOURCES FOR CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL 56 
FEDERAL --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  56 
STATE AND LOCAL FUNDING --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  57 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------  58 
ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------------------  59 
Air versus High Speed Rail? -------------------------------------------- 63 
ADVANTAGES OF AIR TRAVEL AS A VIABLE SOLUTION TO INTERCITY TRAVEL --------------------------  63 
DISADVANTAGES OF AIR TRAVEL AS A VIABLE SOLUTION TO INTERCITY TRAVEL ----------------------  67 
HIGH SPEED RAIL AS A SOLUTION TO THE GROWTH IN INTERCITY TRAVEL ------------------------------  68 
DISADVANTAGES OF HIGH SPEED RAIL -------------------------------------------------------------------------  70 
Analysis of Actual versus Estimate Numbers (Cost & 
Ridership) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 72 4 
 
SYNOPSIS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACT PROCESS ------------------------------------------------------------  72 
ROLE OF ACADEMIA IN ASSESSING ACCURACY ----------------------------------------------------------------  72 
ANALYSIS  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  75 
OPERATION ESTIMATES --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  75 
RECOMMENDATIONS ---------------------------------------------------- 77 
FUTURE OF HIGH SPEED RAIL  ---------------------------------------- 78 
REFERENCES ---------------------------------------------------------------- 79 




























LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1 California High Speed Rail ................................................................................ 6 
Figure 2 Congestion………………………………………………………………………….9 
Figure 3 President Obama’s Vision for High Speed Rail in the U.S…………………...20 
Figure 4 Anaheim to Los Angeles Segment……………………………………………...24 
Figure 5 Travel Demand Model……………………………………………………………31 
Figure 6 2008 Average Air Passenger Departures Based on Haul……………………..35 
Figure 7 Top 10 Destinations for So Cal Air Passengers………………………………..36 
Figure 8 Timeline of Key Events (Acela Express)……………………………………….46 
Figure 9 Full Cost Comparison…………………………………………………………….65 
Figure 10 Cost of Air in California Corridor……………………………………………....66 
Figure 11 Average Cost of High Speed Rail……………………………………………..69 
Figure 12 Population Comparison Japan and California…………………………………71 
 
Table 1 Status of Environmental Review by Each Section……………………………..26 
Table 2 Performance Indicators……………………………………………………………...32 
Table 3 Transit Service Utilization in the SCAG Region………………………………......33 
Table 4 General Aviation Forecast………………………………………………………......36 
Table 5 Benchmarking of the California High Speed Rail…………………………………75 
Table 6 Flyvberg’s cost escalation and ridership for 12 urban rail projects……………..75 



























Despite the economic recession, California’s population is growing rapidly from factors 
such  as  natural  births  and  immigration.  Even  the  most  pessimistic  forecast  shows 
California’s population increasing by millions through the year 2030, and mobility seems 
to continue on being a problem without a solution for the near future.  If a way out is not 
planned  and  implemented  now 
transportation  will  continue  being  a 
problem.    Airport  and  highway 
infrastructure  capacity  continue  to 
cause  delays,  mainly  due  to 
congestion  and  overcrowding.    As  a 
result, air quality continues to suffer. 
Automobile  travel  highly  pollutes  the 
air  with  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  
One way to help curb the greenhouse 
gas emissions caused by automobile travel is by making high speed rail an alternative 
for  commuters.    For  example,  the  California  high-speed  rail  project  can  provide  a 
solution to environmental concerns.  Commuters will be able take advantage of such 
high-speed rail features as downtown-to-downtown connections with travel with speeds 
of up to 220 mph.   
 
Figure 1 California High Speed Rail 
Source: California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009 7 
 
This  report  addresses  some  concerns  critics  have  regarding  the  high-speed  rail, 
including cost and ridership forecasts.  This report presents twelve different sections to 
help address these concerns.   
I.  The first section provides the purpose and need for the study of high speed rail in 
Southern California;  
II.  the second section provides the objectives;  
III.  the third provides the methodology used to come up with the conclusion and 
recommendations;  
IV.  the fourth section provides a background of high speed rail in the United States, 
California, and Southern California;  
V.  the fifth section analyzes existing rail transport in Southern California (intercity 
and commuter rail);  
VI.  the sixth section provides measurement of the current air and rail trips taken in 
Southern California and analyzes the projected ridership of the California high 
speed rail;  
VII.  the  seventh  section  gives  a  case  study  of  Florida’s  Overland  Express  (FOX) 
project  that  was  unsuccessful  during  the  planning  stages,  but  is  now  under 
review as the Florida High Speed Rail project;  
VIII.  the  eighth  section  gives  another  case  study,  the  Acela  Express,  which  is  a 
successful  Amtrak  line  and  is  used  as  an  example  model  for  Southern 
California’s potential upgrade of existing rail;  
IX.  the ninth section compares the European Union’s policy on high speed rail with 
the United States’;  8 
 
X.  the tenth section lists the possible funding sources for high speed rail;  
XI.  the eleventh section provides an analysis of air and high speed rail transport as 
an alternative to automobile travel;  
XII.  Finally, the twelfth section provides an analysis of the estimate numbers of cost 
and ridership of the California high speed rail versus actual numbers taken from 
academic  Flyvbjerg’s  research  on  estimates  versus  actual  numbers  of 
transportation projects. 
 
The following is a summary of the main recommendations derived from this study: 
  Rail improvements within the Orange County segment of the LOSSAN Corridor can 
minimize cost by creating feeder trains instead of new track system. 
 
  Limit new high speed rail line to Los Angeles-Bakersfield-San Francisco 
 













Imagine being able to arrive at the train station five minutes 
before departure, hopping inside the train, turning on your 
laptop  and  catching  up  on  work,  and  in  less  than  three 
hours  you  arrive  at  your  destination.  Ideal?  For  many 
people  it  would  be.    Many  Californians’  spend  countless 
hours in traffic, paying a high price both in monetary and 
non-monetary  value.    When  one  sits  in  traffic  there  is 
nothing productive about it.  California law prohibits the use 
of  cell  phone  while  driving;  limiting  the  amount  of  work  a  person  can  do  in  an 
automobile.  The annual delay per traveler in the Los Angeles metropolitan area is an 
average  of  70  hours  (Texas  Transportation  Institute  2009).    In  2009,  the  Texas 
Transportation Institute issued a report that had the Los Angeles metropolitan area as 
the  most  congested  region  in  the  nation.    San  Francisco  came  in  as  the  fifth  most 
congested area and San Diego, not lagging too far behind, 
took  ninth  place  (Texas  Transportation  Institute  2009).  
With  six  million  additional  people  expected  to  populate 
Southern California in the next 30 years, mobility can only 
worsen (Southern California Association of Governments, 
2009).  Figure 2 Congestion (Wimborne 2008), shows a typical morning commute for 
most Californians.  Increased congestion from highway, air, and rail travel continues to 
increase, emphasizing a pressing need for upgrades, improvements, and expansion. 
Figure 2 Congestion 
 
Source: ABC News (6/13/2008) 
“Traffic Congestion Costs 
California $20 billion per year 
in wasted fuel and time” 





Once it was the image of freedom and liberty, and now for many people it has become 
the opposite, mainly an image of frustration and stress: the automobile.  The popularity 
and dependency of the automobile has led to the issues we face today, mainly highway 
traffic congestion.   Not only is it an issue for drivers, but traffic congestion creates 
environmental concerns.  If given a choice, most people would choose not to be in 
traffic, however, California’s are not offered any meaningful competitive alternatives to 
driving an automobile.  High-speed rail is an opportunity to create a viable alternative for 
commuters traveling throughout California.   
 
However,  whether  a  lack  of  transportation  alternatives  justifies  the  expenditure  of 
billions in taxpayers’ dollars to build high speed rail is a question that must be analyzed 
before  moving  forward.    This  report  will  address  whether  building  a  California  High 
Speed  Rail  is  more  cost  effective  than  upgrading  existing  rail  and/or  creating  new 
airports by analyzing estimated cost and demand for high speed rail service. 
 
This report will analyze a comparative case study: Amtrak’s Acela Express rail upgrade 
of Boston-New York-Washington DC corridor.  The U.S. Eastern Corridor rail line is a 
comparable case to California, with similar densities among connecting regions (San 
Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco). This report will also compare and contrast the 
United  State’s  policy  on  high-speed  rail  with  that  of  the  European  Union’s.    The 
comparison of policies will help provide an analysis of how the U.S. federal government 11 
 
can play a role in the creation of a nationwide high-speed rail network.  The report is 
conducted on behalf of the Orange County Transportation Authority. 
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT  
PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this report is to analyze the projected ridership and cost estimates, and 
the public benefits of building a California high-speed rail segment.  
NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
The momentum to receive funding for the construction of high-speed rail from the U.S. 
federal government has never been as strong.  According to U.S. Vice President Biden, 
California is better positioned than most states to receive federal funding, because  -- 
―it’s been a priority of your governor, it’s been a priority of  your Legislature, they’ve 
talked about it, a lot of planning has been done,‖ (Reston 2009).  The most current 
estimate of the cost of building the California high-speed rail is $45 billion (California 
High Speed Rail Authority 2009).   
The price tag for building high-speed rail is high, but the ―do nothing‖ scenario cost 
might be just as high.  Most highways in Southern California have high volumes of traffic 
and  heavily  impacted  local  streets.    Another  option  to  alleviate  traffic  is  to  continue 
building more airports, roads, and highways.  However, none of these options would 
help alleviate environmental concerns.  Not only is air pollution a serious problem, but 
the flight delays and the cost for flying is continuing to increase and becoming a concern 
for the average person.  Fuel prices will continue to rise as the oil reserve levels drop, 
yet automobile dependency is still the dominant force in transportation options.   12 
 
Growth in Population and Employment 
 
According to the California High Speed Rail Authority, California’s projected population 
is  expected  to  reach  50  million  in  the  next  20  years  (California  High  Speed  Rail 
Authority, 2009).  Currently, Southern California has two of the top ten most congested 
areas in the United States: Los Angeles and San Diego (California High Speed Rail 
Authority,  2009).  California  legislation,  such  as  Assembly  Bill  32--Global  Warming 
Solutions Act-- and Senate Bill 375--Redesigning Communities to Reduce Greenhouse 
Gases--are sure to have an effect of either alleviating or worsening congestion.  Both 
bills focus on limiting suburban sprawl by tying land use with transportation. 
 
California’s budget problems worsened during the housing bubble in the mid years of 
this past decade.  Since then, the California state government has been feeling the 
economic pressure from the effect of the housing crash and the rise of unemployment.  
The California State Legislature fiscal budget for 2009-10 had a gap of $60 billion, with 
a projected gap of $20 billion for fiscal year 2010-11 (Office of the Governor 2010).  In 
the coming years, a challenge California will face is how to regain its previous economic 
competitiveness.  The planning and construction of high-speed rail might be one of the 
solutions to solve our economic crisis.  High speed rail is projected to create nearly half 
a million jobs and improve the quality of life for all Californian residents by reducing 
congestion  and  contributing  to  the  reduction  of  greenhouse  gases  (California  High 




Growth in Travel Demand 
 
Much of the growth in travel demand in Southern California in the past decades has 
been from the automobile.  The future of reduced dependency on the automobile looks 
bleak if transit is not expanded.  Automobile travel for many people is the only option 
due to the lack of alternatives for both short and long distance trips.  Another factor is 
the distressing reality that the public is uneducated about the real price of driving an 
automobile.    Most  people  believe  the  cost  of  driving  ends  at  the  gas  pump.    The 
external  cost  is  the  harm  done  to  the  environment  from  driving  an  automobile.  
However, the invisible cost is not talked about, nor is it calculated in the fuel price.  This 
unseen cost has contributed to the rise of the automobile. 
 
California is the 12
th largest source of greenhouse gases on the planet, with 41% of the 
emissions coming from our transportation system (California High Speed Rail Authority, 
2009).    Projections  suggest  the  increase  in  population  will  create  a  higher  travel 
demand effect.  It is paramount and critical that California increase funding of mass 
transit (buses, light rail, high-speed rail) to create alternative modes of transport for the 
projected rise in the state’s population.  Higher demand for alternative modes of transit 
will also facilitate the implementation of key state legislation, such as: SB 375 whose 
goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Capacity of current intercity air and rail travel 
 
The Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is the only international airport in Southern 
California, with eight other domestic airports (Burbank (BUR), Long Beach (LGB), Santa 14 
 
Ana-Orange  County  (SNA),  Ontario  (ONT),  El  Centro/Imperial  (IPL),  Oxnard  (OXR), 
Palmdale/Lancaster  (PMD),  Palm  Springs  (PSP),  and  San  Diego).  In  2000,  Los 
Angeles International was ranked as the third busiest commercial airport (SCAG, 2003).  
The  two  passenger  rail  lines  for  the  Southern  California  region  are  Amtrak  and 
Metrolink.  Amtrak is an intercity rail line, while Metrolink is a commuter rail line, both of 
which rely heavily on government subsidies and due to California’s economic crisis they 
have recently had to reduce service. 
 
Los Angeles International Airport 
Los  Angeles  International  accounts  for  15,000  general  aviation  operations  and  two 
percent  of  all  airport  activity  (SCAG,  2003).    In  2002,  there  were  177,000  air  taxi 
operations with a growth forecast that is supposed to double by 2030 (SCAG, 2003).  
While Southern California boasts from many airports, many of them are in urban areas 
and  are  constrained  due  to  their  built  out  urban  environment,  NIMBY  (not-in-my-
backyard) attitude, and physical capacity for basing aircraft (SCAG, 2003). 
 
Orange County John Wayne Airport 
John Wayne Airport is a commercial airport with forty-two turbine aircraft and over 500 
propeller driven aircraft (SCAG, 2003).  The number of annual passengers that John 
Wayne airport is allowed to have is limited to 10.8 million under the existing Settlement 
Agreement  (SCAG,  2003).  The  forecasted  growth  for  this  airport  is  one  percent 




Existing rail in Southern California consists of intercity rail (Amtrak) and commuter rail 
(Metrolink).  85% of the people that take Metrolink are for work purposes, while Amtrak 
is known for being more of a longer destination trip train (SCAG, 2008).  Neither Amtrak 
nor  Metrolink  have  a  reputation  for  their  service  from  downtown  to  downtown 
destinations.  In fact, most people that ride the trains have multiple mode splits for their 
total trip.  Aside from having poor connections, service is limited.  Due to the economic 
crisis, their service has been reduced to a limited number of times, days, and locations. 
 
In order to keep up with the projected growth in population, California will have to build 
nearly 3,000 lane-miles of freeway, in addition to five airport runways and 90 departure 
gates by 2020 (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).    Those projections are 
based  on  the  same  number  of  travelers  a  high-speed  train  system  could  service 
(California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  The California High Speed Rail Authority 
plans to build  the  stations  in  downtown-to-downtown  centers  where  passengers can 
more easily connect to other modes of transit network.  Fast trains that connect with 
other  transportation  modes  are  an  attractive  option  to  consumers  of  travel,  and  are 
competitive with automobile travel.  This trend may be the beginning of the development 








This report will address the following objectives: 
 
  To identify the pros and cons of upgrading the existing rail in comparison to 
building a high speed rail line.  
 
  To identify the importance of the role of the U.S. federal government in 
implementing high speed rail versus the European Union’s role in high-speed rail. 
 

























Study activities consist of the following steps: 
 
1.  Internal focus groups with transportation peers, professional report client, and 
faculty advisor to discuss the high-speed rail potential for the Southern California 
region. 
 
2.  The literature review will include: 
a.  Definitions and standards 
b.  Impact on urban form and land use development 
c.  Features and context on high speed rail case studies 
d.  Public’s opinion on high speed rail (Editorials, Newspaper) 
 
3.  Analysis of  technical reports  that  document  ridership numbers for the ACELA 
case study 
 
4.   Analysis  of  the  projected  ridership  data  for  the  proposed  Los  Angeles  to 
Anaheim high-speed rail segment in Southern California from the California High 
Speed Rail Authority reports 
 
5.  Analysis of the annual ridership numbers for the Southern California inter-city, 
Southern  California  Commuter  Train  Service  and  air  trips  from  the  Southern 
California Association of Government (SCAG) 
 
6.  European Union analysis and comparison to the United States Federal role in the 
development of high speed rail policy 
 
7.  Qualitative data includes: 
a.  Interviews: 
i.  Andreas Lischke, German Aerospace Center (DLR) 




Many questions face the public about high-speed rail:  If high-speed rail (HSR) is built in 
the  State  of  California,  will  there  be  demand  for  such  a  system?   What  will  be  the 
environmental benefits  derived  from  high-speed  rail?    How  much  congestion  will be 
reduced from highways and streets?  What will be the economic impact from the job 
creation derived from HSR?  Lastly, and most importantly, how will the $45 billion high-
speed rail project be funded?   
 
High-speed rail is not a new phenomenon.  Florida’s FOX project (Florida Overland 
Express) and Texas (TGV Projects) have attempted to build high speed trains, but their 
attempts  have  been  mostly  unsuccessful  and  have  achieved  minimal  outcomes  to 
advance high speed rail in the nation (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009).  
Reports attribute the failure of high-speed rail projects to a lack of popular support and 
high cost.  The public did not support the program because of the high cost associated 
with the finance of HSR, and public awareness that it would be mostly have to be paid 
through taxpayer’s dollars (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009).  
  
In 2008, funding for high speed rail projects occurred at both the national and the state 
level (ARRA funds and CA Proposition 1a).  The federal role for high-speed rail projects 
became more of a national priority starting under the leadership of President George W. 
Bush.  The federal role became even more pronounced under President Obama.  At the 
state level, it was under the leadership of California’s Governor Schwarzenegger.  In 
recent  years,  no  other  state  comes  close  to  the  State  of  California  in  planning  and 19 
 
building a high-speed rail line.  Funding for high-speed rail will be discussed in detail on 
Section 8 of this report. 
U.S. High Speed Rail 
 
The vision and funding for high-speed rail prior to the Obama Administration was almost 
non-existent in the federal government (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009).  
It was not until the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 that Amtrak was created.  The 
original intent of the Federal Government was to have Amtrak be a private enterprise, 
but Amtrak has been unsuccessful in getting enough revenue to cover its operating 
cost.  In fact, Amtrak has needed substantial subsidies from the federal government to 
keep operating (Congressional Budget Office, 2003).  From 1970 to 2001, Amtrak has 
received nearly $24 billion for capital and operating needs from the federal government, 
while the number of passengers reached about 22 million each year within the 45 states 
that  Amtrak’s  trains  service  (about  60,000  passengers  per  day,  on  average) 
(Government  Accountability  Office,  2001).    The  original  purpose  of  Amtrak  was  to 
provide intercity passenger rail service, which had almost become obsolete since the 
automobile culture took force (Fisher, 2009).   
 
As mass transit died off, so did the investment from the private sector (Fisher, 2009).  
This was especially evident in Southern California.  Prior to the boom of the automobile, 
land  speculators  like  Henry  Huntington  invested  in  light  rail  for  the  Los  Angeles 
metropolitan area (Fisher, 2009).  It was a profitable business until the post WWII era, 
when many factors that led to the demise of the rail lines (Fisher, 2009).  The main 
reason for its demise was that operating costs exceeded revenue; it was an unprofitable 20 
 
business (Fisher, 2009).   This marked the end of private investment in passenger rail 
lines for the Southern California region (Fisher, 2009).   
Federally Designated High Speed Rail Corridors 
Figure 3 ―President Obama’s Vision for High Speed Rail,‖ shows a map of the United 
States  and  the  federally  designated  corridors  across  the  U.S.    It  is  important  to  be 
designated  as  a  federal  corridor  in  terms  of  federal  funding  because  only  federal 
corridors can apply for high-speed rail grants. 
Prior to the Obama Administration, high speed rail had never received much attention or 
substantial funding (Government Accountability Office, 2001). Part of the reason why 
Figure 3 President Obama’s Vision for High Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Source:  Jason Lee, White House Aid 21 
 
there has been no interest from the federal government may be due to Amtrak’s inability 
to  become  a  profitable  or  self-operating  entity  without  any  governmental  subsidies 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2003).   
 
What caused the renewed interest from the federal government in high-speed rail? 
Transportation is constantly evolving as new technology emerges.  The invention of the 
automobile benefited many and became the symbol of freedom for many Americans.  
Being  an  automobile  culture  has  also  brought  problems.    Most  serious  is  the 
environmental  degradation  caused  by  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  other  hazard 
pollutants that are released through the different transportation modes. 
 
President George W. Bush’s last term in office was the beginning of federal funding for 
high  speed  rail:    allocating  several  billions  in  funds  through  the  Passenger  Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act.  Enacted in 2008, it was an opportunity to identify the 
vision  and  goals  for  a  U.S.  high  speed  rail  and  integrate  it  into  the  national 
transportation system (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009).  It also authorized 
$1.5 billion in funding (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009).  Aside from the 
$1.5 billion, the recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment of Act of 2009 
(ARRA) initiated by the Obama Administration, appropriated $8 billion solely for high-
speed  rail,  intercity  passenger  rail,  and  capital  grants  (the  latter  of  which  were 
authorized by the PRIIA) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009).  Priority will be 
given  to  projects  that  supported  the  development  of  high-speed  rail  service  (U.S. 
Government  Accountability  Office,  2009).    U.S.  Vice  President  Biden  asserted  that 
California was in a good position to receive a large portion of the high speed rail grant 22 
 
(Reston, 2009). The deadline for that grant money  was in the first week of October 
2009.  Out of the $8 billion stimulus money, California was awarded $2.25 billion dollars.  
California High-Speed Rail Authority 
 
Established in 1996, the California High-Speed Rail Authority (Authority) is the state 
entity responsible for planning, constructing, and operating a high-speed train system 
serving  California's  major  metropolitan  areas  (California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority, 
2009).  The Authority has a nine-member policy board and a core staff to implement the 
high-speed train system in California.  It was mandated by the State of California to 
direct the development and implementation of inter-city high-speed rail throughout the 
state (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  The proposed California High-Speed 
Train Project is a large and complex public works project on a scale comparable with 
the construction of Interstate 5 in California in the 1960’s and 1970’s (California High 
Speed Rail Authority, 2009). 
 
Encompassing  more  than  800  route  miles,  the  proposed  California  high-speed  train 
system will provide intercity travel in California between the major metropolitan centers 
of Sacramento, the San Francisco Bay Area, the Central Valley, Los Angeles, the Inland 
Empire, Orange County, and San Diego (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  It 
will be using ―steel on wheel‖ rail technology, which has already been used in Europe 
and Asia.  The highest operating speed is expected to reach 220 mph, with capabilities 
of up to 250 mph (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  Environmental Impact 
Reports have predicted an expected ridership of 102.4 million passengers by the year 
2035  (California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority,  2009).    It  will  be  operating  on  almost 23 
 
exclusive track, though for the most part it will be adjacent to existing rail or highways in 
order  to  mitigate  environmental  impacts.  Based  on  the  Environmental  Impact 
Reports/Environmental  Impact  Statements  (EIR/EIS),  the  cost  to  implement  the  full 
statewide California high-speed train system is anticipated to be $45 billion (California 
High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).   




Orange County occupies 798 square miles and is located in Southern California - south 
of Los Angeles County, north of San Diego County, and west of Riverside and San 
Bernardino  counties.  There  are  thirty-four  cities  within  Orange  County,  with  a 
population of nearly 3.1 million (Orange County Transportation Authority, 2009).  It is 
projected that by the year 2015 the population will increase to nearly 3.5 million, an 
increase of 13 percent (Orange County Transportation Authority, 2009).   
 
Orange County's economic success is partially attributed to the amenities provided to its 
residents such as prestigious financial centers, numerous shopping and entertainment 
centers, community colleges, a California State University campus, and a University of 
California  campus.    Also,  Orange  County  offers  many  amusement  parks,  including 
Disneyland, Disney California Adventure and Knott's Berry Farm. Convenient air travel 
is  provided  through  John  Wayne  Airport,  and  countywide  bus  and  rail  services  are 
provided by OCTA, Metrolink, and Amtrak. 
 24 
 
This report will focus on the California segment going from Anaheim to Los Angeles 
(See Figure 4).  The proposed alignment for the Anaheim to Los Angeles section will 
travel along the existing Los Angeles – San Diego Rail Corridor (LOSSAN) between the 
Anaheim Regional Transportation Intermodal Center (ARTIC) and Los Angeles Union 
Station.  In  accordance  with  the 
California Environmental Quality Act 
(CEQA)  and  the  National 
Environmental  Policy  Act  (NEPA), 
the  California  High  Speed  Rail 
Authority  (CHSRA),  in  cooperation 
with  the  Federal  Railroad 
Administration (FRA) has begun the 
environmental  process  for  the 
Anaheim  to  Los  Angeles  segment.  
The 2008-09 state budget provided 
$46,488,000  to  continue  project 
implementation  (California  High 
Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  Of this amount, $3.5 million are local funds provided by 
the  Orange  County  Transportation  Agency  (OCTA).    This  brings  OCTA’s  total  local 
investment since 2007 to $7 million (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  It is 
the  largest  contribution  of  any  regional  transportation  agency  in  California  (Orange 
County Transportation Authority, 2009). 
 
Figure 4 Anaheim to Los Angeles Segment 
 
Source: California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009 25 
 
Environmental Impact Review Background 
 
The environmental impact report for the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment identified the 
existing Los Angeles to San Diego (LOSSAN) Passenger Rail Corridor as the preferred 
alignment for this section, with stations in Irvine, Anaheim, Norwalk / Santa Fe Springs, 
and Los Angeles Union Station (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  Given the 
constrained nature of the corridor, high-speed trains should share the corridor with the 
other passenger  rail  operators  in  the  area,  which  include  trains  run  by  the  National 
Railroad  Passenger  Association  (Amtrak)  and  the  Southern  California  Regional  Rail 
Authority (Metrolink).  However, this is somewhat premature because agreements have 
not  become  public  yet,  so  whether  cooperation  will  occur  between  agencies  is  still 
another issue that has yet to be resolved.  
 
While  the  EIR/EIS  identified  the  preferred  corridor  as  extending  from  Irvine  to  Los 
Angeles, this report will only focus on the section between Anaheim to Los Angeles that 
is expected to be implemented before the Irvine stop.  High-speed trains will have an 
estimated trip time of approximately 20 minutes between the Anaheim and Los Angeles 
stations,  with  maximum  speeds  approaching  125  mph  (California  High  Speed  Rail 
Authority, 2009).  The time of 20 minutes only takes into account if there are no stops 
between Anaheim and Los Angeles.  There will most likely be more than one stop in 
between the connection which includes another stop in Orange County and one in Los 
Angeles County, location of stops have not been determined.  This will undoubtedly 
increase the estimated trip time.    26 
 
Table 1 below lists the status for each stage of the environmental process and gives a 
comparison for the status of the different segments of the high-speed rail train.  The 
segment  that  is  the  most  advanced  is  the  Anaheim  to  Los  Angeles  segment.    It  is 
possible  that  if  the  region  completes  the  environmental  process  before  the  other 
regions.  It has a possibility of being constructed before the rest of the regions.  It is 
imperative that such issues: as intermediate stops and new rail versus upgrading rail 
become solved.  
Table 1: Status of Environmental Review by Initial Section 
 
Source: California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009 
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The high-speed train system is projected to carry a minimum of 42 million passengers 
annually  (32  million  intercity  trips  and  10  million  commuter  trips)  by  the  year  2020 
(California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority,  2009).    Once  the  EIR  is  completed  and  the 
business  plan  approved  by  the  California  legislature,  the  next  process  would  be  to 
satisfy the environmental review process for both state and federal laws (California High 
Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  The following section gives a detailed background on the 
existing rail in California.  
Existing Rail Service in California 
 
 
This segment of the report will provide an overview of the existing rails in Southern 
California: intercity rail, commuter rail, and freight service rail.  
Intercity Passenger Rail 
 
In California, Amtrak runs intercity passenger rail as well as in other parts of the United 
States.  There are four different Amtrak routes: Capitol, Pacific Surfliner, San Joaquin 
and Coast.  The State of California, through the Department of Transportation Division 
of Rail, supports three Amtrak intercity passenger rail services, including the LOSSAN 
(Los Angeles to San Diego and San Luis Obispo) Rail Corridor’s Pacific Surfliner.  The 
California  Department  of  Transportation  (DOT)  Rail  Division  helps  with  funding  and 
planning assistance, including operating and capital grants for station and equipment 
improvements (California Department of Rail Division, 2009). 
 
Like  most  passenger  rail  services  in  the  United  States,  California’s  routes  need 
government subsidies to continue operation.  Generally, the revenues received from the 28 
 
farebox  are  insufficient  to  cover  the  expenses.    The  problem  from  a  consumer’s 
perspective is the time and cost difference that is well above that of its main competitor, 
the automobile. Another issue is that service is limited; a person that misses a train will 
have to wait sometimes a couple hours for the next available train.  
Commuter Rail 
 
The regional commuter rail line for Southern California is Metrolink it operates in six 
different counties.  The Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) provides 
and  maintains  Metrolink’s  services  and  facilities.    Metrolink  systems  consist  of  53 
stations;  it  carries  over  36,000  passengers  trips  and  operates  143  train  trips  per 
weekday (SCAG, 2004).  The average train trip length for this rail line is 37 miles and 
79% of their frequent riders take Metrolink four or more days per week (SCAG, 2004).  
Most of their passengers use their service to commute to work.  Metrolink stations are 
typically  not  in  downtown  areas  and  about  54%  of  their  customers  use  connecting 
transit to complete their trips (SCAG, 2004). 
Freight Service 
 
There are five principle rail alignments in the Southern California region, owned by two 
railroads: the Union Pacific Railroad and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF).  The 
majority of freight that comes through the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports use rail to 
move to other regions.  To help facilitate the movement of freight, the region has been 
committed on improving the flow traffic by building grade separations which eases traffic 
in the area.  However, the freight rail companies (BNSF and UP) have been very vocal 
about their unwillingness to cooperate and/or form partnerships with the California high- 29 
 
speed rail authority.  A controversial issue to having freight in high-speed trains is the 
weight of freight.  Freight trains typically weight substantially, and in order for a high- 
speed train to achieve the maximum speed its weight needs to be low and with heavy 
freight cargo that would be almost impossible.  That issue alone could be a reason for 
the lack of interest among the freight rail companies to cooperate with high speed rail.  
ISSUES OF MEASUREMENT  
 
This segment of the report is an analysis of the current rail and air annual ridership 
numbers which, will help in assessing the reliability of the projected ridership numbers 
for  the  California  high  speed  rail  segment.  This  section  will  provide  the  different 
definitions of high-speed rail and an analysis of the projected ridership numbers for the 
California high speed rail. 
 
Defining High Speed Rail and Intercity Passenger Rail (IPR) Definitions 
 
High speed rail will vary in speed not only within the California high speed rail segment 
but also in all of the United States corridors.  To help differentiate the levels of high 
speed rail, the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration Department released the definitions 
each state should use when applying for federal funds.  Below are the definitions used 
by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  It seems that California is 
unique in that it has the potential to overlap a number of the definitions listed below 





HSR  –  Express.    Frequent,  express  service  between  major  population 
centers 200-600 miles apart, with few intermediate stops.  Top speeds of 
at least 150 mph on completely grade-separated, dedicated rights-of-way 
(with  the  possible  exception  of  some  shared  track  in  terminal  areas).  
Intended  to  relieve  air  and  highway  capacity  constraints. 
 
HSR  –  Regional.    Relatively  frequent  service  between  major  and 
moderate population centers 100-500 miles apart, with some intermediate 
stops.    Top  speeds  of  110-150  mph,  grade-separated,  with  some 
dedicated  and  shared  track  (using  positive  train  control  technology).  
Intended to relive highway and, to some extent, air capacity constraints. 
 
Emerging HSR.  Developing corridors of 100-500 miles, with strong 
potential for future HSR Regional and/or Express service.  Top speeds of 
up to 90-110 mph on primarily shared track (eventually using positive train 
control technology), with advanced grade crossing protection or 
separation.  Intended to develop the passenger rail market, and provide 
relief to other modes.   
 
Conventional Rail.  Traditional intercity passenger rail services of more 
than 100 miles with as little as one to as many as 7-12 daily frequencies; 
may or may not have strong potential for future high-speed rail service.  
Top speeds of up to 79 mph to as high as 90 mph generally on shared 
track.  Intended to provide travel options and to develop the passenger rail 





















Travel Choice Models 
 
In California, a person has several choices to choose from when making a decision on 
their transportation mode (auto, rail, air).  In Southern California, the most popular travel 
choice  is  automobile  travel.    There  are 
38,000 square miles connected by 9,000 
lanes of freeway (SCAG, 2004).  It has 
also  been  among  the  most  congested 
regions  in  the  nation  since  1990.    Our 
travel choices have caused harmed to the 
environment,  being  a  large  contributor  to 
the greenhouse gas emissions.  Figure 5 
shows that transportation has not kept up 
with population and travel demand (SCAG, 2004).  Ninety nine percent of all trips rely 
on highways or arterial networks (SCAG, 2004).  Auto travel and congestion continue 
on being a huge problem for the region.  In 2000, the total daily delay from congestion 
was estimated to be 2.2 million person hours (SCAG, 2004). 
Rail Ridership Comparison 
 
The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) is the agency responsible for 
overseeing all rail activity.  In Southern California, we have two passenger rail lines: 
Amtrak  and  Metrolink.    Below  are  figures  from  Caltrans  Division  of  Rail  Operations 
Report from 2008-09.  To summarize the findings, rail transit has decreased from the 
previous years.  Some of the factors that can be attributed to the decreased numbers 
are the increased fares and the reduction of service due to budget cuts.  
Figure 5 Travel Demand Model 32 
 
Caltrans Division of Rail Operations Report from 2008-09: 
 
  9.8% decrease in ridership from the 2007-08 numbers 
  On-time performance increased by 10.7 percentage points (90.4%) 
  Revenue drop of 5.1% 
  Expense drop of 2.5% 
  Farebox ration (49.5%) decreased by .8% from 2008 levels 
 
In  order to  calculate  the  numbers above,  Caltrans  used  performance  indicators that 
measure the numbers from the previous year with the current year, as well as inputting 
the  business  goal numbers and  averaging  the  difference  (Caltrans,  2008).    Table  2 
Performance  Indicators  shows  that  the  current  rail  service  performances  which  are 
based on ridership, revenues, and expenses are not a profitable business.  Not enough 
people are using the current rail service.  Studies have shown that the two main factors 
for  using  public  transit  are  cost  and  time.    The  CAHSRA  will  have  to  analyze  the 
numbers below in great detail and try to focus on keeping the current market and on 










Table 2. Performance Indicators 
 















5,327  5,327  0.0%  5,651  -5.7% 
Revenues 
(000) 
$105,136  $103,071  2.6%  $112,315  -5.9% 
Expenses 
(000) 




50.3%  51.1%  -.8 
Percentage 
points 





86.6%  79.8%  10.7 
Percentage 
Points 
86.0%  .6 
Percentage 
points 
Source: Data retrieved from the California Department of Transportation Rail Division 
 
 
The Pacific Surfliner services the LOSSAN corridor.  Below is an operations report for 
the fiscal year 2008-09. 
  Ridership was down 4.0% compared to 2007-08 
  On-time Performance was 80.8% (5.5 percentage points better than 2008) 
  Revenues decreased 2.4% and expenses increased 4.7% compared to the prior 
year 
  Farebox ratio decreased to 57% (4.2 percentage points below last year) 
 
Table 3 Transit Service Utilization in the SCAG Region breaks down the different type of 
transit along with the percent utilization of available seats per miles for the year 2000 
(SCAG, 2004).   According to Table 3 the most utilized transit was light rail for Los 
Angeles County and commuter rail for Orange County (its only passenger rail service).  
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Air Ridership Comparison 
 
The largest airport in Southern California is Los Angeles International which ranks 5
th 
worldwide,  all  the airports  combined  create one of the  busiest  regions  in  the  nation 
(SCAG 2008).  In 2002, seventy eight million passengers were served in the region, and 
the projected growth forecast is that the number is supposed to double before the year 
2030 (SCAG 2008). Airports are a vital part of the local economy, every one million 
regional passengers creates a positive economic impact of $620 million (SCAG, 2008).   
 
Airports while creating many economic benefits are very difficult to get approved; most 
people have the not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) attitude that ends up killing projects to 
expand or create new airports.  The cost of expanding airports is also more expensive 
than  upgrading  existing  rail.    Another  detriment  is  that  urban  airports  are  physically 
constrained; in order to expand most airports would have to buy out neighborhoods.  
High speed rail would eliminate the need for short distance flights and would free air 
space for out of state and international flights.  
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Figure 6 below shows the air ridership numbers for 2008 based on the number of miles.  
As is shown from the graph, we can see the highest number of departures are from 
those  traveling  anywhere  from  201  to  600  miles.    High  speed  rail  would  drastically 
reduce this number and allow longer destination flights to increase their capacity and 
attract more travelers to the Southern California region.  The need to expand the airport 
would also be delayed as many of their passengers would switch to high speed trains. 
Figure 6 2008 Average Air Passenger Departures by Length of Haul 
Source: Data retrieved from the Southern California Association of Governments, 2008 
 
Figure 7 below shows the top ten destinations from the Southern California airport and 
among those top ten are: Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and Sacramento.  All of 





































Daily Passenger Departures by Length of Haul for LA Basin Airports 
4th Quarter 2008
(BUR, IPL, LAX, LGB, ONT, OXR, PMD, PSP, SNA)36 
 
Figure 7 Top 10 Destinations for Southern California Air Passengers 
 
Source: Data retrieved from the Southern California Association of Government, 2008 
 
Table 4 shown below shows the general aviation forecast.  All the regions in Southern 
California are expected to grow and for some airports even double its activity.  However, 
as mentioned in the earlier sections of this report, most of the airports are located in 
urban areas and are physically constrained from future growth. 
 
Table 4 General Aviation Forecast 
  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030 
Imperial  105,250  110,278  115,556  115,556  121,875  131,931 
Los 
Angeles 
2,130,999  2,282,557  2,432,018  2,432,018  2,380,213  2,780,316 
Orange  340,088  356,189  372,255  372,255  388,306  420,965 
Riverside  600,526  624,249  661,967  661,967  699,169  777,326 
San 
Bernardino 
766,859  811,508  858,893  858,893  906,961  1,008,278 
Ventura  371,500  377,392  383,129  383,129  396,827  402,937 
TOTAL  4,315,222  4,562,173  4,562,173  4,823,818  5,095,362  5,521,753 































Top 10 Markets for LA Basin Airports 
3rd Quarter 2008
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As the demand increases, so will the airports physical capacity and this will lead to less 
profitable  airlines  or  routes  being  pushed  out  of  airports  (SCAG,  2003).    The  less 
profitable routes are the airlines which service short distance flights between 200 and 
600  miles  and  they  are  mainly  served  by  smaller  airlines  (i.e.  Southwest  Airlines).  
However, Southwest Airlines are beginning to expand their service by providing more 
long distance destination flights.  Such airlines might see the benefit of eliminating short 
destination flights and supporting the construction of high speed rail.  It is estimated that 
by 2030, urbanized commercial and general airports will have reached their physical or 
legal capacity (SCAG, 2003).  According to an interview with a staff from the California 
high speed rail Authority, small airlines did not lobby against Proposition 1a which will 
contribute $9.9 billion towards high speed rail (Interview 9/2009). 
 
California High Speed Rail Projected Ridership 
 
 
Projecting accurate ridership numbers is central to the success of high speed rail.  It is 
important not only for California but for the rest of the nation who will witnesses our 
successes or our failures.  If California’s high speed rail project becomes a success it 
might snowball to the rest of the nation who might jump on board and begin their own 
high speed train networks.   
 
A ridership projection is important for a business plan because it helps determine the 
profitability.    Once  a  ridership  projection  is  estimated  then  the  profitability  can  be 
calculated  by  analyzing  the  projected  revenue from  ticket fares minus  the  operating 
cost.  The most recent projected ridership is estimated to average 13.5 million riders by 38 
 
2020  and  41 million  riders per year  in  2035  for the  entire  800  mile  high  speed  rail 
network (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009). 
 
It is estimated that over a third (12 million) of the projected air ridership numbers for 
2030  would  be  diverted  to  high  speed  rail  and  about  6%  percent  (50  million)  auto 
travelers would switch to high speed rail (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  
More stops will also generate an increase in the number of riders.  This might have the 
effect of creating a fast intercity rail system instead of having a true long distance high 
speed rail network.  However, the number of stops is difficult to negotiate because of 
the politics and possible money involved to help construct the high speed network. 
 
A private company, Cambridge Systematic (CS), was contracted by the California High 
Speed Rail Authority to develop the ridership projection.  Their analysis consisted of: 
modeling  California’s  current  and  future  population,  employment,  household 
characteristics, highway network, air and rail services, and transit systems (California 
High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  Surveys were given to passengers flying into the 
cities with a high speed train stop and they were geared to gathering information such 
as: recent trips and their valuations of travel time, cost, and reliability in order to assess 
the diversion that would be created from such modes of travel (California High Speed 
Rail Authority, 2009).   
 
The model that CS used predicted future trip making from forecasts of population and 
employment and then compared the travel time for each mode of travel per household 39 
 
(along  with  other factors)  (California  High  Speed  Rail Authority,  2009).    High  speed 
trains will be able to carry anywhere from 1,300 to 950 passengers and have more room 
than the conventional airplane with amenities such as a cafe (California High Speed 
Rail Authority, 2009). 
 
An  accurate  ridership  projection  for  this  scale  of  a  project  is  absolutely  necessary.  
Unlike other public transportation systems (bus/rail), high speed rail is committed to not 
asking  for  public  subsidies  once  operations  begin.    The  California  High  Speed  Rail 
Authority Governing Board feels confident that the projections will attract the predicted 
ridership  numbers.    However,  in  case  that  the  California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority 
(CHSRA) does not meet their projected ridership once the high speed trains go into 
operation then what are the possible scenarios? The twelfth section of this report goes 
more  into  detail  on  estimate  versus  actual  ridership  and  cost  numbers,  as  well  as 
operation and maintenance cost.  
 
According to a recent newspaper article in the Los Angeles Times, the California High 
Speed Rail Authority has not come up with possible scenarios in case they fail to meet 
projections  (McGreevy,  2010).    Jeff  Barker,  a  spokesperson for the  California  High 
Speed Rail Authority was quoted on saying that such details will be addressed in the 
future (McGreevy, 2010).  Eric Thronson, a fiscal and policy analyst for the Legislative 
Analyst Office (LAO), called a risk assessment in the business plan ―incomplete and 
inappropriate for a project of this magnitude‖ (McGreevy, 2010).  Assemblyman Niello 
(R-Fair Oaks) who sits on the Assembly Transportation Committee, also expressed his 40 
 
concern for a project of  this magnitude  (McGreevy,  2010).    It  is imperative  that  the 
California High Speed Rail Authority begin to address this along with other concerns 
that might surface in the future.  Past attempts on building high speed rail networks 
have illustrated the importance of political and public support for high speed rail. 
REVIVED FLORIDA HIGH SPEED RAIL PROJECT  
 
This section provides a case study of the FOX project, it was one of the first planned 
high  speed  train  projects  that  was  derailed  already  having  gone  through  extensive 
planning. There is an analysis of potential pitfalls and lessons to be learned from a 
project that was unsuccessful.  Also, it is important to note that this project has recently 
been  revived  due  to  Federal  funding  possibilities.    The  State  of  Florida  applied  for 
federal stimulus money for $2.3 billion dollars and has a good probability that it will 
receive close to that amount.  
Background 
 
The Florida high-speed rail corridor, previously known as the Florida Overland Express 
(FOX) project, initiated the planning of a new rail system between Miami, Orlando, and 
Tampa.  The high-speed rail line would cover 320 miles with seven stops along the 
route  and  reach  speeds  of  200  mph  (GAO,  1999).    In  1999,  the  U.S.  General 
Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on the feasibility of this new rail line.  During 
the release of the report, the estimated cost was anywhere from $6 to 8 billion (GAO, 
1999).    The  important  players  involved  in  this  project  were:  Florida  Department  of 
Transportation (FDOT) and the Fox Consortium, of which included: Fluor Daniel, a U.S.-41 
 
based  engineering  and  construction  firm;  Alstom,  the  manufacturer  of  French  TGV 
trains; and Bombardier, a manufacturer of rail passenger cars (GAO, 1999). 
Analysis  
 
Operation of the FOX project had an expected completion date of 2005.  However, the 
project failed.  The failure of the project is largely blamed on an uncertain estimated 
cost, ridership forecast overestimate, finance plan, and lastly, an unattainable schedule 
projection  (GAO,  1999).    But  with  all  major  infrastructure  projects  money  was  the 
biggest  issue:    in  short, no one  wanted to pay  for it.    The federal government  was 
unable to assist monetarily for any of the construction cost (GAO, 1999).  The U.S. 
General Accounting Office report from 1999 indicates that the FOX project was seeking 
$2 billion loan amount under the Department of Transportation’s new Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, whose budget was limited to 
$530 million for all the states who sought loans for high speed train projects or rail 
upgrades  (GAO,  1999).    The TIFIA  program  is designed  to  help  large  infrastructure 
projects—those  costing  at  least  $100  million  or  50  percent  of  a  state’s  federal-aid 
highway apportionment for the preceding fiscal year—access capital by using federal 
funds to leverage substantial private investment (GAO, 1999).  The amount requested 
by the FOX project was well above what it could loan.  
 
A  recent  study  published  by  the  National  Research  Council  notes  that  large 
transportation infrastructure costs are commonly 50 to 100 percent above projections, 
while usage (ridership) can be 20 to 60 percent lower than projections (Skamris and 
Bent, 1996).  Private funding was limited due the wide skepticism of being able to attain 42 
 
estimated  ridership.  If  ridership  turned  out  to  be  lower,  then  operating  cost  and 
maintenance might have led to a huge deficit, which would have forced taxpayers to bail 
out the rail companies.  Public opposition grew against the project because of the high 
cost, and by the fact that most of the cost would be shouldered by the public.  The 
momentum was lost due to a weak public relations campaign from the FOX consortium 
and an uneducated public of the benefits high speed trains would create.   
Lessons Learned 
 
Lack  of  public  and  political  support  over  a  lengthy  period  is  why  the  FOX  project 
ultimately failed (GAO, 2009).  The FOX project failed under a political administration 
that did not support the project (GAO, 2009).  Prior to that administration, the State of 
Florida had committed to provide $70 million annually to the project, but withdrew that 
obligation under Governor Jeb Bush’s leadership (GAO, 2009).  Public skepticism of the 
projected  ridership  made  it  easier  for  the  governor  to  terminate  the  funding  (GAO, 
2009).  
 It  is  very  important  for  the  California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority  to  not  lose  the 
momentum, especially public and political support.  Transparency and confidence in the 
project will play a major role in determining whether the project fails or succeeds.  
Future of HSR in Florida 
 
Florida has experience with high speed trains, already having gone through extensive 
planning in for their high-speed rail corridor.  No longer called the FOX project, it has 
been renamed to be called the Florida High Speed Rail Project.  The estimated cost for 
the Tampa to Orlando section is $3.5 billion while, the section from Orlando to Miami is 43 
 
projected to cost $8.5 billion (FDOT, 2010).  Their previous experience made Florida a 
very a strong candidate to receive a large portion of the requested $2.6 billion grant 
application for their Tampa-to-Orlando high-speed rail line (Goll, 2010).  On January 28, 
2010, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) announced the Florida Department of 
Transportation (FDOT) would receive $1.25 billion as part of the High Speed Intercity 
Passenger Rail Program (FDOT, 2010).  The first phase of construction that is listed on 
their website is the Tampa to Orlando segment (FDOT, 2010).  It is possible that the 
revived interest in high speed rail has been due to the influx of federal grant money 
towards high speed rail.  It is very probable that Florida will have a high speed rail in 
service in the near future; their past experience will have served as lessons learned for 
the possible issues that can come up in the coming years of continued planning.  
ACELA CASE STUDY 
 
The Acela Express Amtrak service is the closest project to being the first case study of 
emerging high speed rail in the United States.  It is located in the Northeast region of 
the United States and it is the first attempt in constructing and running an incremental 
high speed rail system (Government Accountability Office, 2006).  The Acela Express 
corridor travels through some of the densest areas in the Eastern United States, such 
as: Washington D.C., New York City, and Boston.   It can be compared to the California 
high speed rail project in terms of having similar densities: San Diego, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco.  This segment of the report will give an overview of the Acela Express, 
including its successes and failures.  An analysis of the Acela Express will help the 
California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority  prevent  similar  pitfalls  in  the  planning  of  the 44 
 
California high speed rail project. It will also help analyze whether upgrading existing rail 
is more cost effective than the construction of new dedicated high speed rail lines. 
Overview 
 
Acela Express began as a small improvement project through Amtrak and ended up 
evolving into a high speed rail system (Government Accountability Office, 2006).  The 
Northeast corridor is the busiest passenger rail in the country; serving about 2/3 the 
passengers  combined  from  all  Amtrak  rail  lines  (Government  Accountability  Office, 
2006).  The Acela express rail line is the busiest of all rail lines, generating the most 
revenue for Amtrak (Government Accountability Office, 2006).  However, its success 
has not come without problems, mainly due to the lack of planning that happened prior 
to its construction.  As a consequence the system has undergone many challenges that 
might  have  been  prevented  if  more  time  had  been  spent  on  a  thorough  planning 
analysis of the project (Government Accountability Office, 2006).     
Acela Express Analysis 
 
Development of Acela Express Analysis 
 
Acela Express was developed because there was a need for improving the rail system, 
but also for reducing travel time between some of the densest corridors in the northeast 
region of the United States.  Acela was developed as part of the Northeast Corridor 
Improvement Project (NCIP), a plan that goes back to the 1970s and consist of a variety 
of improvement projects, among them being the three hour train ride from Boston, New 
York, to Washington D.C. (Government Accountability Office, 2006).  The technology for 
Acela was based on the French TGV (train à grande vitesse, French for ―high speed 45 
 
train‖).  In 1996, Amtrak executed contracts with train manufacturers Bombardier and 
Alstom to build 20 high-speed train sets and 15 electric high horsepower locomotives; 
construct three maintenance facilities; and provide maintenance services for the Acela’s 
train sets (Government Accountability Office, 2006).   
Below is a timeline and a background on the problems Amtrak experienced during the 
development of the Acela Express program (Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
Key Dates and Issues: 
 
  Operation began in 2000  
  In 2002 Acela was shut down for two months (resulting in huge image loss for the 
system and a legal fight between Amtrak and the train set company) 



































Aside  from  some  of  the  technical  and  maintenance  difficulties,  Acela  Express  has 
managed to become the most profitable and self sustaining route from all the Amtrak 
corridors.  For fiscal year 2004, Amtrak’s Acela program accounted for about 44 percent 
of the total revenue on the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak’s busiest rail route (Government 
Accountability Study, 2006).   In 2006, 2,668,174 passenger journeys were made on an 
8.8% increase over 2005 (Government Accountability Study, 2006).  The numbers keep 
rising and it is predicted that they will continue to rise as more improvements are made 
to the rail lines and as people become more environmentally conscious.  
 
Acela Express has been able to divert air and highway users to using mass transit and 
most of it has been due to its competitive time  schedule in comparison to air travel 
(avoiding excessive security/delays/comfort) and highway users (traffic delays).  Acela’s 
name  was  derived  from  the  terms  excellence  and  acceleration  and  only  years  later 
renamed to Acela Express (Government Accountability Study, 2006).  The idea behind 
the  name  was  to  create  a  brand  for  the  service  based  on  those  two  concepts, 
excellence and acceleration (Government Accountability Study, 2006).  The marketing 
and branding of the Acela Express as fast, comfortable, low prices, and reliable has 
been  one  of  the  most  important  successes  that  Amtrak  has  accomplished.  Acela 
Express executives were focused on designing products that meet travelers’ needs and 
focused  on  building  the  brand  around  ideas  that  came  directly  from  customers 
(Cassedy, 2002).  
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Acela Express is a major improvement in rail service being the only rail to come close to 
competing  with  airline  industries.  The  fastest  Acela  Express  timing  for  the  456  mile 
Washington,  DC  to  Boston's  South  is  just  over  6  1/2  hours,  an  average  of  72mph 
(116km/h) (Government Accountability, 2006).  The stretch from New York Penn Station 
to  Washington,  DC  225  miles  takes  2  hours  48  minutes,  an  average  of  80mph 
(129km/h)  (Government  Accountability,  2006).    Even  with  all  its  successes  Acela 




Most of the failures that Acela Express experienced occurred during the initial years of 
planning and service, such as: keeping the Acela project on schedule and attaining the 
project  goal of  a 3  hour trip  time  between  Boston  and  New  York City  (Government 
Accountability  Office,  2006).    Many  critics  blame  the  United  States  Federal  Rail 
Administration for Acela’s problems specifically for not being able to keep its original 3 
hour  trip  from  NYC-Boston-DC  (McCaughrin  2007).    The  restrictions  imposed  have 
prevented Acela Express to come close to being like that of its counterpart in France 
and  Japan  (McCaughrin  2007).  Such  regulations  dealt  with  weight  limitations  and 
buffering  standards  which  caused  slower  speeds,  faster  wear  tear  problems,  higher 
prices, and possible higher risk in case of collisions (McCaughrin 2007).  
 
Key Issues that the Acela Express faced (Government Accountability Office, 2006): 
 
  new technology 
  impacts from new safety standards to accommodate high-speed rail 49 
 
  manufacturing and production delays, 
  abbreviated testing of the trains prior to placement in revenue service 
 
Acela Express also went through a legal suit with the manufacturing of the trains and 
had to stop service in 2002 and again in 2005, which hurt Acela’s image and ridership 
numbers.  However, it has overcome most of the failures and its future looks bright. 
 
Federal law limits train sets to not go above 110 mph in urban areas.  Amtrak trains 
were able to upgrade their tracks and trains to allow for such higher speeds and at 
much lower cost than it would be to build dedicated rail for high speed service.  The 
Southern California region consists of mostly urban areas, which will limit the speed a 
train can go.  Train sets like Acela Express can serve as feeder trains for Southern 
California’s high speed rail service.  Acela Express is still considered high speed rail 
because  of  its  capability  to  go  faster  therefore,  the  California  trains  would  also  be 
considered high speed trains but with a lower price tag.  It would save a large amount of 
taxpayer’s dollars to consider feeder trains, like Acela Express to serve most of the 
Southern California and parts of the Northern California region, while limiting high speed 
service to major urban hubs, such as: Los Angeles and San Francisco.  
 
The California High Speed Rail Authority should emulate the Acela Express in corridors 
where  federal  limits  its  speed,  mainly  urban  areas.    The  lower  price  tag  can  help 
increase the number of feeder trains in the corridor and can help increase construction 
speed on the Los Angeles to San Francisco rail lines, which would be the only true High 50 
 
Speed Rail Express under the federal definition.  Increasing the number of feeder trains 
will be very appealing in comparison to an air travel.  The time difference would also not 
be much different because the upgraded train sets would be capable of going faster. 
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN HIGH SPEED RAIL 
 
This segment of the report will analyze the European Union’s vision for high speed rail.  
It will also compare and contrast Europe’s transit with the United States by looking at 
different factors: urban characteristics, transit quality, and lastly, transit behavior.   
EU’s Vision for High Speed ail  
 
Public transit is not a new phenomenon for European countries; high speed rail is but an 
extension of public transportation.  With the integration of European countries into the 
European Union, transportation integration for the movement of goods and people has 
become a forefront issue within member countries.  The European Union Treaty obliges 
the EU countries to contribute to the organization and development of Trans-European 
Networks  (TENs)  in  the  areas  of  transport,  telecommunications  and  energy  supply 
infrastructure.  European Commission Treaty (Articles 154 and 155), focuses on  the 
establishment and  development  of  trans-European  networks in  the  area  of  transport 
(European  Commission,  2006).    One  of  the  initial  concerns  was  technical  and 
operational  barriers  to  trade,  since  most  European  countries  have  developed  high 
speed rail were built from a national perspective (European Commission, 2003). 
 
A large part of the investments in TENtransport (about 25% in 1996/97) is currently 
concentrated  on  high-speed  railway  lines,  often  connecting  major  conurbations 51 
 
(European  Commission,  2006).  The  European  Union  policy  is  focused  on  limiting 
suburban  sprawl  by  tying  transportation  to  its  land  use  plans  (similar  policy  only 
happened recently in California with the passage of SB 375).  High speed rail plays a 
central role in continuing to integrating land use and transportation. 
European Union High Speed Rail Policy 
 
A key difference between the U.S. and Europe is the harmonization of their high speed 
rail policy among all the member states of the European Union.  The European Union’s 
spatial  development  policy  and  urban  development  measures  plays  a  big  role  in 
influencing the behavior of local business and the population in order to improve the 
possibilities  for  a  shift  from  road  traffic  to  transit  (European  Commission,  2006).  
European Union’s commitment to mass transit is apparent, we just have to analyze the 
increase of passenger traffic from rail which increased from 217 billion to 290 billion 
passengers from 1970 to 1998 (European Commission, 2006).  The European Union 
realizes the importance of mass transit, specifically high speed rail and have outlined 
priority  projects  that  includes  several  high  speed  rail  lines  in  different  European 
countries (European Commission, 2006). 
 
In order to attract more passengers to rail and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the 
European Commission formed the "railway package" measures which are laid out in the 
White Paper (European Commission, 2006).  Below is a list of key issues relating to rail 
found in EU’s White Paper. 
Key points: 52 
 
  ensuring high-quality rail services; 
  removing barriers to entry to the rail freight market; 
  improving the environmental performance of rail freight services; 
  gradually setting up a dedicated rail freight network; 
  progressively opening up the market in passenger services by rail; 
  improving rail passengers' rights. 
The German Intercity Express  
 
Germany’s passenger high speed rail services can be compared to California’s planned 
high speed rail in that both offer intercity rail destinations.  Another  similarity is that 
California  is developing  its  rail  system  based  on  similar concepts  the  Germans  had 
when they first developed their plans for a passenger rail system. The development of 
Germany’s high-speed Intercity Express (ICE) service came in response to the declining 
share of the transportation market that rail faced in the 1960s, combined with capacity 
problems on the nation’s highway, air, and rail networks (Vaca, 1993).  The German 
national policy response was a decision to shift as much passenger and freight traffic as 
possible onto the rail mode (Vaca, 1993).  While the California high speed trains will be 
exclusively  for  passengers,  there  can  be  future  collaboration  opportunities.  In  an 
interview with Andreas Lischke from the German Aerospace Center (DLR) (1-26-10), he 
emphasized again that the decision to implement high speed rail was not to solve the 
congestion problem but to create a competitive option to the air industry. 
 
Intercity Express (ICE) service began with two routes between Hamburg-Munich and 
Basel  via  Mannheim.    Since  then,  the  line  has  expanded  to  include  many  more 53 
 
domestic stops, as well as international connections such as the: Paris-Brussels-KoIn-
Amsterdam service.  Key to the implementation of high speed trains in Germany is that 
the decision to build the new infrastructure was not based upon any feasibility study or 
demand projection showing that the service and capacity were needed (Vaca, 1993).  
Rather, it was more of a policy decision to meet an obviously growing transportation 
demand with rail.  
 
During  the  initial  planning  of  the  ICE  rail  system,  Deutsche  Bundesbahn  (DB),  the 
German national railway, roughly estimated that the increased speed and comfort would 
cause  rail  ridership  to  rise  by  about  30  percent  while  decreasing  the  number  of  air 
passengers  (Vaca,  1993).      DB  was  accurate  in  their  rough  estimate  of  ridership 
numbers.    Lufthansa  did,  in  fact,  experience  a  50  percent  drop  in  ridership  on  the 
Hannover-Frankfurt corridor once the ICE began operation, and the rail ridership in fact 
increased by about 30 percent (Vaca, 1993).  The Berlin to Hannover high speed rail 
line  began  in  1998,  and  soon  after  it  led  to  the  elimination  of  the  air  route  for  this 
segment (Lischke Interview, 1-26-10).  
Urban Form Characteristics 
 
European  Union  member  countries  developed  their  high  speed  rail  using  different 
business plans which caused frustration with integrated transport policies.  Since the 
development of the EU, the European Commission has developed policies focused on 
establishing an integrated transport system.  In France, part of the Netherlands, Italy 
and  South  Belgium,  high  speed  trains  carry  passengers  on  long  distance  trips,  on 
dedicated passengers’ rail lines, without connecting medium-sized towns along the way 54 
 
(European  Commission,  2006).    While  in  Germany,  Spain,  and  part  of  Italy,  Great 
Britain  and  North  Belgium,  high  speed  rail  creates  an  intercity  network  connecting 
regional and local cities at a maximum speed of 200-250 km/h (European Commission, 
2006).  In the United States, the Acela Express carries passengers on long distance 
trips.  While the California High Speed Rail Authority can be compared to Germany’s 
high speed network, connecting medium-sized towns along the way.  The stops that are 
being planned for California’s high speed trains are similar to Europe’s model where 




In order to make the railways more attractive, the European Commission strengthened 
their passengers' rights policy to better protect the passenger - particularly with regard 
to  reimbursement  for  train  delays  (European  Commission,  2006).  The  European 
Commission also directed for easier access to information and fares, and the option of 
buying international rail tickets more easily (European Commission, 2006).  For Europe 
the cost comparison from flying or taking a high speed train  can be higher than air 
travel.  Just like air travel, the sooner in advance a passenger books a ticket the better 
price the ticket will be.  However, the ticket for a high speed train also takes into account 
excellent  customer  service  that  many  claim  European  airlines  lack  (Tremlett,  2009).  
Another benefit is that passengers do not have to go through airport controls and can 
arrive just minutes before the train leaves.  The European high speed rail shares similar 
characteristics to Acela Express, in that passengers prefer the comfort of extra room, 




Europe’s mass  transit  system  is  more  advanced  than  the  United  States  in  terms of 
technology and ridership numbers.  However, like in the United States, Europe also 
faces the challenge of an increased number of people driving automobiles.  Between 
1970 and 2000, the number of cars in the European Union increased from 62.5 million 
to nearly 175 million, carrying 79% of passenger traffic (European Commission, 2006).  
While the number of automobile owners has increased, their use of high speed rail and 
mass transit system has also increased. 
Contrast between the U.S. and the European Experience 
 
The ultimate difference between the United States and European countries is that their 
central  government  generally  funds  the  majority  of  up-front  costs  of  their  country’s 
respective high speed rail projects, and they do so without the expectation that their 
investment will be recouped through ticket revenues (GAO, 2009).  Even Spain’s high 
speed network which is considered to be among one of the most successful in Europe 
still needs public subsidies (GAO, 2009). Spanish officials told the U.S. GAO that the 
original high speed line in Spain between Madrid and Seville has been profitable on an 
operating  cost  basis  but  has  not  covered  all  of  its  costs,  including  the  original 
construction costs and it is predicted by a Spanish academic that future high speed 
lines might not cover even their operating costs (GAO, 2009). 
 
Although Europe has a more advanced high speed rail network than the United States, 
their stages for planning are very elementary.  Most European countries lack available 
data  on  ridership  numbers  before  the  construction  of  their  high  speed  rail  projects.  56 
 
Unlike the U.S., many of the European investors rely less on ridership forecasts and 
more on policy goals for justification of spending billions on a transport system (Vaca, 
1996).  In Europe, most people use and are familiar with mass transit, and the demand 
for public transport is high, while the opposite is true for most places in California where 
the demand for public transport is low (Vaca, 1996).  In California, rail or mass transit 
hardly exists in most places.  Therefore, a transition to high speed rail and eventually 
mass transit system is a new idea and one that leads investor to believe is a riskier 
investment.  
FUNDING SOURCES FOR CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL 
 
Central  to  this  analysis,  is  the  question  of  how  high  speed  rail  will  be  funded  in 
California.    In  this  section,  I  will  analyze  several  different  funding  sources:  Federal, 
State, Local, and Public-Private Partnerships. 
Federal 
 
The  American  Recovery  Restoration  Act  of  2009  allowed  states  to  apply  for  
corridor-wide infrastructure improvements.  There were two different application options 
each state could have chosen or combined; improving existing rail or creating new rail.  
While a comprehensive phasing strategy would have helped  meet current demands, 
Governor Schwarzenegger opted to apply solely for the new rail line grant.  
 
According to the California High Speed Rail Authority, ―California is the best-prepared 
state in the nation to receive and maximize the benefit of a $4.7 billion share of $8 
billion in federal funding for high-speed train development under the American Recovery 57 
 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)‖ (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).   Below 
are facts from California High Speed Rail Authority website: 
  The only project offering 200+ MPH service 
  No other state is farther along in planning and development 
  Prepared to break ground as early as 2011 
  The only high-speed train in America backed with state and local funds 
  Matching state and local financial support – billions of dollars in voter-approved 
financing 
  A decade of engineering and design work in place 
The required criteria listed to apply for ARRA funds include (Federal Register, 2009): 
  Project and program selection should focus on achieving trip time reductions on key 
operational segments of the LOSSAN Corridor, as well as reducing overall trip time 
between Los Angeles and San Diego. 
 
  Los Angeles – Anaheim:      20 minutes (current 40 minutes) – 50 percent reduction 
  Los Angeles – San Diego:     2 hours or less (current  2 hours 51 minutes) – 42 percent 
reduction 
 
In addition to the ARRA grant in August 2009, California applied for another $1.1 billion 
for  improvements  to  existing  intercity  passenger  rail  services  and  near-term  job 
creation.  
State and Local Funding 
   
 
Ever since the creation of the California High Speed Rail Authority, the California state 
government has provided funds for studies for the feasibility of a statewide network of a 
high speed rail system.  The 2007-08 California State budget provided $20.7 million to 
continue project implementation, including the preparation of a project financial plan, 58 
 
project management activities, identification of critical rights-of-way acquisitions and the 
continuation  of  detailed  project  design  and  related  environmental  studies  (California 
High  Speed  Rail  Authority,  2009).    A  $9.95  billion  dollar bond  measure  was  on  the 
November 2008 ballot with $9 billion for implementing high speed rail and $950 million 
for improvements to other rail services that connect to the high-speed rail service and it 
passed by the voters of California (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  The 
funding will largely come from bond money.   
 
Local funding contribution will come from stations where the high-speed train system 
shares corridors with existing services, such as: Metrolink between Los Angeles and 
Anaheim (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).   However, the state’s current 
financial  crisis  has  investors  choosing  to  put  their  money  in  other  investments  over 
California’s bonds.  If the state cannot sell bond money, then high speed rail is in a 
position where its construction might be delayed for an unknown period.  Local funding 
will  also  be  difficult  being  that  they  are  also  dealing  with  cuts  from  state  funding.  




The California High Speed Rail Authority anticipates private sector contribution for the 
construction  and  operation  of  the  high  speed  rail,  including  project  debt  financing, 
vendor financing, system operations and private ownership (California High Speed Rail 
Authority, 2009).  In order to gage the amount of interest the private sector would have 
in  investing  into  the  high  speed  rail  project,  the  Authority  released  a  Request  for 59 
 
Expression of Interest (REFI) (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009).  Some of the 
results from the REFI showed that despite uncertainty in the financial markets, private 
sector  interest  remains  strong  (California  High  Speed  Rail  Authority,  2009).    The 
Authority expects public-private partnership contribution to the high speed rail project to 
be anywhere from $10 to $12 billion (California High Speed Rail Authority, 2009). 
 
The  amount  of  private  investment  being  asked  is  very  high  amounts  than  what  the 
private sector is used to contributing.  Below is an analysis of past private investments 
into  mass  transit  transportation  and  current  investment  into  mass  transit  in  the  Los 
Angeles region.  
Analysis of Private Investment 
 
Current  large-scale  transit  projects  such  as  the  Exposition  Light  Rail  Line  are  very 
costly.  The Exposition Line is expected to be roughly $640 million dollars and will be 
financed through mostly Proposition C, the ½ cent sales tax.  This means that everyone 
in Los Angeles County who shops will pay for a light rail system that they may not use.  
Joseph Giglio and William D Ankner proposed in their 1998 article ―Public  – Private 
Partnership:    Brave  New  World‖  that  much  of  the  nation’s  transportation  system  is 
commercially viable and should not be treated as a true public good.  They feel that 
private industries should take a role in public transit and that public agencies would 
benefit from the competitive nature of the private sector (Giglio, 1998). With growing 
concern  about  the  funding  of  large-scale  transportation  projects  many  economists 
suggest a public – private partnership or just private rail system could be more cost 
effective.  In Los Angeles during the1920’s public transit policy was completely in the 60 
 
hands of private industries and subsequently failed.  The policy set forth in the 20’s was 
inherently flawed and should serve as a guide for what should not be done to fund 
current transit programs such as the Expo Light Rail Line. 
Historic  Policy:    In  the  1920’s  Los  Angeles  had  the  Red  Cars,  one  of  the  most 
extensive rail lines in the United States with 1,150 miles of track and 109 million annual 
passengers.  Forty years later in 1960 the Red Cars were all shut down and many of the 
rail  lines  torn  out.    There  are  many  theories  on  why  this  occurred,  from  a  General 
Motors Conspiracy to the public’s general dislike of slow rail, to the public’s growing 
desire to have an automobile.  David J. St. Clair concludes that the fall of the Red Line 
was purely economical and that one of the main contributing factors was the public 
transit policy that was prevalent in the 1920’s.  According to St. Clair ―Public transit 
policy  in  the  1920’s  was  generally  based  on  the  franchise  system.    The  transit 
franchisee,  a  private  transit  company,  acquired  a  legal monopoly  over  public  transit 
operations in the area and in exchange the transit company paid the city a franchise 
fee.  The private industry also provided services for the city such as street maintenance 
(St. Claire, 1986).‖  The transit operators benefited from this monopoly through transit 
revenue and real estate development profits.  This proved to be their downfall as the 
automobile became much more attractive for travelers and the real estate development 
profits were a onetime deal.  The private industries were then unable to pay off the debt 
they owed for the capital improvements and many went out of business or taken over by 
public transit agencies.   
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Comparison of historic and contemporary issue:  The funding of transit projects has 
always been an issue of debate because public transit is generally regarded as a public 
service that only is used by a small percentage of the population.  The 1920’s policy of 
providing the private industry with an exclusive monopoly of public transit is just not 
good planning because of the inherent nature of public transit today.  As we can see 
from  the  past,  private  industries  are  motivated  by  revenue  generation  and  are  not 
concerned about providing access and mobility to people who have no other alternative.  
The problem with funding such a public service is the question of who pays.  Back in the 
1920’s the private industries paid for transit projects because they got benefits from 
other sources than farebox revenue.  Now the operating  costs of transit projects far 
outweigh the revenue generated from the farebox.  Public transit operates at a loss in 
Los Angeles; the government subsidizes it to provide a service to the community, not to 
make money.  Michael Brooks describes public transit as a public good and therefore ―it 
is likely that in a market economy people will under allocate resources to the production 
of public goods‖ (Brooks, 2002). The responsibility of funding public transit projects is 
now in the hands of the public agencies because the role of public transit shifted in the 
1920’s.    The  rate  of  automobile  travel  grew  in  leaps  and  bounds  because  the 
automobile was growing in prevalence due to its inherent benefits over the Red Cars.  A 
public-private  venture  would  be  irresponsible  because  the  two’s  core  ideologies  are 
mutually exclusive.   
 
The  1920’s  policy  of  providing  private  agencies  a  franchise  would  not  work  for 
contemporary transportations projects.  The whole system in Los Angeles has changed 62 
 
and it is impossible to duplicate the success that occurred in the 1920’s because of the 
domination of the automobile and the public service role that public transit has now 
shifted to.  A better solution to funding issues in the Los Angeles area would be putting 
the cost on to the automobile drivers because drivers were the cause of the fall of public 
transit and are also more responsible for the other sorts of damage that public transit 
industries  try  to  alleviate.    The  other  problems  that  the  MTA  has  to  alleviate  are 
congestion issues, and air quality problems.  So a way to solve the funding crises of the 
many public transit agencies would be to impose either a higher gas tax or mileage fee.  
Europeans currently pay much more for gas, in London they have a mileage fee, and 
their transit ridership is much higher than ours.  This would provide a large sum of 
revenue and also increase transit ridership in our system while reducing congestion and 
therefore improving air quality.    





















Air versus High Speed Rail? 
 
The following section provides an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of air 
travel and high speed rail as a viable solution to intercity travel.   
 
Currently,  in  Southern  California  the  automobile  covers  the  majority  of  intercity 
transportation.  The domination of the automobile  raises some concern because the 
automobile is not a viable solution to dealing with the large increase in intercity travel for 
several  reasons.    First,  California’s  freeway  networks  are  becoming  increasingly 
congested  and  construction  of  new  freeways  will  not  be  able  to  keep  up  with  the 
projected growth in intercity travel nor will construction of new freeways actually solve 
the  problem  of  congestion.    Second,  automobiles  are  environmentally  damaging 
because automobiles pollute the air while only transporting a few passengers.  Third, 
the automobile is unable to provide the timesaving benefits that other modes of travel 
such as high speed rail or airplanes can provide for long distance intercity travel.    
Advantages of Air Travel as a viable solution to intercity travel 
 
Airplanes have many attributes that make them a desirable alternative to the automobile 
or high-speed rail for long intercity travel.  John D. Kasarda mentions that airports are 
the  fifth  wave  in  transportation  induced  urban  development.    According  to  Kasarda, 
airplanes  are  flying  the  country  into  the  21-century  because  the  need  for  speed, 
flexibility and reliability in the movement of people and products is taking center stage in 
our fast paced global environment (Kasarda, 2000).   Airplanes such as a Boeing 747 
can travel 567 miles per hour and can provide nonstop travel to anywhere an airport 
exists for roughly 900 passengers (Kasarda, 2000).  Kasarda mentions that intellectual 64 
 
capital is becoming the key to success in the business atmosphere so the time saving 
benefits provided by airplanes are unmatched.  The airplane does not require rights of 
way so travel can be nonstop and reliable because there are fewer issues of congestion 
or accidents.  High-speed rail would require its own right of way because the curvatures 
of high-speed rail need to be less significant because of higher travel speeds.  This 
leads to a higher capital cost.  Air does not rely on fixed capital improvements such as 
rail lines.  If there is some reason why travel between two cities decreases high-speed 
rail does not have the flexibility to divert to another city without building more tracks.  Air 
can easily change their schedule to an area where an airport exists.   
 
Other benefits such as low fare airlines (i.e. Southwest Airlines) and frequent flier mile 
are incentive programs that encourage intercity travel.  Low cost airlines also give the 
consumer a choice of the type of service they want.  If the intercity traveler wants to pay 
more they are fully capable of going first class with all the perks while another person is 
also able to go bare bones and pay for a no frills airline like Southwest.  The airline 
industry  also  thrives  in  areas  where  there  are  concentrated  areas  of  development 
surrounded by generally barren areas.  California fits this scenario rather well because 
the areas of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego are large metropolitan areas 
but their surrounding cities are urban sprawl.  Even areas outside of California have 
similar  attributes.    Arizona,  Nevada,  Oregon, Washington,  New  Mexico  all  have  the 
majority of their population situated about a larger urban area and airport while being 
surrounded by large tracts of underdeveloped territory.   
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The  Institute  of  Transportation  Studies  at  the  University  of  California  Berkeley 
conducted an extensive research report titled, ―The Full Cost of Intercity Transportation 
– A Comparison of High Speed Rail, Air and Highway Transportation in California‖.  This 
report  by  David  Levinson,  David  Gillen  Abid  Kanafani  and  Jean-Michel  Mathieu 
concluded  that  the  most  economical  option  for  the  California  Corridor  was  air 
transportation.   
Figure 9 Full Cost Comparisons 
 
 
Source: Levinson et al., 1996 66 
 
The cost per passenger-kilometer traveled (pkt) for air transportation was $0.1315 for 
air,  which  was  significantly  lower  than  high-speed  rail  ($.2350/pkt)  and  highway 
($.2302/pkt) (Levinson et al., 1996).  Their extensive research took into account the 
external  costs  (accidents,  congestion,  noise,  and  air  pollution)  internal  costs 
(construction, operations and maintenance) and user time costs.  The cost break down 
according to their report is as follows:   
Figure 10 Cost of Air in California Corridor 
 
Source: Levinson et al., 1996 
ARTCC  is air  route  traffic  control  centers,  TRACON  is terminal radar  control  areas, 
ATCT is air traffic control towers, and FSS is flight service centers.  Capital costs make 
up the bulk of the total cost with the cost of planes consisting of almost 50%.  The 
external/social costs only make up 6% of the total cost.  High-speed rail does have 67 
 
lower external/social costs but overall it is a small percentage that air can offset this 
disadvantage through mitigation efforts like soundproofing nearby areas. 
Disadvantages of Air Travel as a viable solution to intercity travel 
 
Airports  and  airplanes  create tremendous benefits for travelers  but  the  question  still 
remains  whether  airplanes  are  the  best  alternative  to  the  car  or  high-speed  rail  for 
intercity  travel  in  California.  While  airplanes  do  not  require  the  construction  or 
maintenance of expensive right of ways like cars and high-speed rails require, airports 
do create their own set of problems.   
 
Airports are very expensive structures that take up a lot of space.  In order to provide 
the  time  saving  benefits  airports  must  be  located  within  urban  areas.    This  causes 
numerous problems.  One of the major problems is that airports are a significant cause 
of air pollution.  In Southern California our air quality is one of the poorest in the nation 
and  Los  Angeles  International  Airport  (LAX)  is  the  third  largest  source  of  smog  in 
Southern California (SCAG, 2004).  The reason for this is because U.S aircraft remain 
largely exempt from air pollution rules.   The International Civil Aviation Organization 
governs  airports.    Noise  pollution  being  another  major  is  also  a  concern  for  areas 
around airports where the average population density is around 85,000 people in the 
65-decibel noise contour, which is high enough to warrant federal soundproofing (Erie, 
2004).   
 
All  of  these  factors  contribute  to  a  ―not-in-my-back-yard‖  (NIMBY)  attitude  when  it 
comes to creating or expanding airports.  In order for LAX to be a viable solution to 68 
 
intercity travel LAX will need to expand its passenger handling capacity to account for 
the future growth of the region.  The public for the reasons listed above vehemently 
opposed the master plan LAX expansion proposed by former Los Angeles City Mayor 
Richard Riordan.  An alternative to the LAX expansion was moving the entire facility to 
Palmdale, which is a remote area of Los Angeles that would be able to house a very 
large structure without expensive right of way acquisitions and community opposition.   
The move to Palmdale would effectively erode many of the time saving benefits of the 
airplane  because  Palmdale  is  60  miles  away  from  LAX.    The  Levinson  et  al  report 
created in 1996 does not take into account the September 11
th tragedy.  Since then 
former  Mayor  James  Hahn  refocused  the  LAX  master  plan  to  stress  security  and 
modernization rather than excess capacity.  The September 11
th terrorist attack has had 
major influence on the shape and growth of air travel.  Security is now a priority so the 
time delay figure will be increased as well as capital costs because expanded security-
screening technology.   
High Speed Rail as a solution to the growth in intercity travel 
 
High Speed Rail (HSR) can be very effective in carrying a large amount of passengers 
at  a  high  rate  of  speed  while  consuming  far  less  energy  and  emitting  less  toxic 
emissions then air transit.   
 
The proposed high speed rail plan connects to downtown to downtown locations.  This 
is beneficial because rail operates best where there is a high density of people all going 
to one area.  Downtown Los Angeles would benefit from high speed rail because of the 
already existing mass transit connections (light rail and bus) from Union Station to many 69 
 
parts of Los Angeles County.  Another advantage besides the time saving benefits is 
the location of being close to the central business district which has the potential to 
induce more business.  Since high speed rail is fitted to a dedicated right of way the risk 
of terrorism is lower and therefore even more time can be saved because the security 
check  in  process  would  be  considerable  shorter  then  air  travel.    Levinson’s  report 
showed that high speed rail has the lowest levels of external costs (Levinson et al., 
1996).   
Figure 11 Average Cost of High Speed Rail 
 
Source: Levinson et al, 1996 
One  of  the  major  benefits  of  high  speed  rail  is  that  the  external  costs  are  virtually 
nonexistent  except  for  noise.    Accident  rates  are  low  because  the  whole  system  is 
grade separated, pollution levels are nearly zero because the high speed rail is electric 
and  the  cost  of  energy  is absorbed  into  the  cost of  producing  electricity  in  general.  
Since it is a dedicated right of way there are no congestion levels.  Basing the decision 
of  which  service  would  be  best  for  California  on  only  one  factor  such  as  total  cost 
effectiveness is not really good planning, taking account of external/social costs is very 
important.  With environmental problems and community opposition growing against air 70 
 
travel,  high  speed  rail  provides  a  great  alternative  that  is  cleaner  and  friendlier  to 
neighborhoods.  Since LAX is having a very difficult time trying to expand high speed 
rail might be a more feasible solution but not necessarily the most cost effective.  High 
speed rail would only require a couple of lanes of rail laid out.  Existing right of way 
could be modified to compensate for the increased speeds of rail and the costs could be 
lowered because of this.  Another major benefit of  high speed rail is that it has the 
potential to spur growth in underdeveloped areas.  Access to the Central Valley will 
increase and unlike air, high speed rail would stop in those areas and economic growth 
could occur.   
Disadvantages of High Speed Rail  
 
High-speed  rail  has  it  shares  of  disadvantages  that  cast  doubt  on  its  viability  in 
becoming the mode of choice for the expected growth in intercity travel in California.  
The Business Plan for the high speed rail system estimates the whole system to cost to 
be up to $45 billion dollars.  This is a large sum of money that is used solely for one 
purpose.  Airports do cost a lot of money but they have secondary uses because they 
are used for transporting people and cargo from other countries and other states, unlike 
a fixed capital expenditure like the high speed rail lines.  David Levinson also points out 
that new rail lines sometimes spur denser development around stations but states that 
mostly  they  promote  dispersion  with  park  and  ride  lots  encouraging  sprawling  type 
suburban living (Levinson, 1996). Also the central valley citizens would have cause for 
complaint because the plan does not have that many stops in the area but the rail line 
will cut through their neighborhoods and farmlands disrupting cities and business while 
not providing many benefits.  Some experts argue that high speed rail has worked well 71 
 
in Japan and France and therefore it should work for California.  The problem with this 
is  that  Japan  has  what  Adib  Kanafani  calls  concentrated  demand.    California’s 
population is mostly bipolar with lots of people in Los Angeles and San Francisco and 
few in between.  Japan has many areas where population levels are quite high, so this 
would be a great area for the skip stop patterns of rail (Kanafani, 1994).  The levels of 
demand then would be lower than the train is capable of handling so there would be a 
waste of resources because the trains would be emptier and thus decrease the value of 
such an expensive structure. Figure 12 shows a comparison between the population 
clusters of California and Japan along where the high speed rail route would go through.  
Figure 12 Population Comparison Japan and California 
 








Analysis of Actual versus Estimate Numbers (Cost & Ridership) 
Synopsis of Government Contract Process 
 
The California High Speed Rail Authority contracts out projects to consultants who are 
in charge of calculating the cost and ridership numbers for high speed rail passengers 
as well as the alternatives to high speed rail (air and highway).  Government contracts 
usually go through an extensive competitive process to receive such projects.  Most of 
the work being done in regards to cost and ridership has been through the consulting 
firm Parsons Brinckerhoff and Cambridge Systematic.  Typically these are contracts that 
are substantially valuable in monetary terms.  Being that the consulting firms benefit 
tremendously from such contracts, there is no incentive to provide accurate numbers 
besides honesty and integrity.  Transportation infrastructure projects are not the only 
projects  that  have  been  underestimated  in  cost  and  overestimated  in  ridership.  
Accuracy in demand forecast for rail projects is important to consider for many factors.  
The demand forecast is used to then calculate the environmental and socioeconomic 
benefits.  Aside from that, it also serves allocate scarce funds.  
Role of Academia in Assessing Accuracy  
 
There  are  opponents  that  criticize  high  speed  rail  based  on  unfounded  reasons.  
However, there are also others who do not criticize high speed rail itself, but do criticize 
the accuracy of numbers such as: ridership and cost estimates.  Mainly, it is within 
academia that we see much of the criticism which is surrounds the facts and accuracy 
of numbers derived from consultant’s works.  In particular, Bent Flyvbjerg stands out as 
one  of  the  leading  academics who  has  presented  case  studies  and  research  which 73 
 
proves that the majority of the estimates of infrastructure projects are underestimated in 
cost and overestimated in ridership numbers.  
 
The objective of Flyvbjerg’s et al. article, ―How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in 
Public  Works  Projects?,‖    is  to  answer  the  question  of  accuracy  of  demand  in 
transportation projects by establishing a sample of transportation projects that is large 
enough to permit statistically valid answers.  The article concludes that the majority of 
rail projects overestimated their demand forecast.  The formula Flyvbjerg uses to find 
the inaccuracy is one I also use to compare California high speed rail demand forecast, 
which is the actual minus forecasted traffic in percentage of forecasted traffic (Flyvbjerg, 
2005).  Actual traffic is counted for the first year of operations, similarly to forecasted 
traffic which is the estimate for the first year of operations (Flyvbjerg, 2005).  Flyvbjerg 
uses  a  total  of  210  transportation  projects,  including  both  rail  and  road  projects  in 
developed  and  developing  countries  to  measure  the  inaccuracy  of  traffic  forecast 
(Flyvbjerg, 2005).   
 
Flyvbjerg’s  results  present  a  striking  reality  of  forecast  demands  for  rail  projects.  
Flyvbjerg’s findings are that ―rail passenger forecast were overestimated by an average 
of 105.6%, resulting in actual traffic that was on average 52.4% lower than forecasted 
traffic,‖ both numbers were at the 95% confidence interval (Flyvbjerg, 2005).  Flyvbjerg 
concludes that rail forecast estimates are significantly misleading and that policymakers 
and  planners  should  take  more  into  account  risk  assessment  and  management 
regarding travel demand (Flyvbjerg, 2005).  74 
 
Bent Flyvberg’s second article on the subject, ―Cost Overruns and Demand Shortfalls in 
Urban  Rail  and  Other  Infrastructure,‖  demonstrates  the  general  point  that  urban  rail 
projects are grossly underestimated in terms of cost projection.  His conclusion, if used, 
would  help  improve  economic  and  financial  risk  assessment  of  large  infrastructure 
projects  (Flyvbjerg,  2007).    Flyvbjerg’s  study  consists  of  comparing  434  urban  rail 
projects with 214 other transportation infrastructure projects; his conclusions provide 
statistically  significant  results  in  regards  to  risk  assessment  of  building  a  project 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007).  The article emphasizes the current lack of accountability to produce 
sound empirical results of estimating cost projections for large infrastructure projects.  
This  report  takes  the  same  methods  that  Flyvbjerg  used  to  calculate  the  difference 
between forecast and actual construction costs, which are actual costs minus forecast 
costs in % of forecast costs (Flyvbjerg, 2007).  
 
Flyvbjerg’s findings show that rail has the largest cost escalations with an average of 
44.7% in comparison with bridges, tunnels, roads, and other projects and for 25% of 
urban rail projects cost escalations are at least 60% with an actual ridership that is on 
average  51%  lower  than  forecast  (Flyvbjerg,  2007).    Flyvbjerg  concludes  that  the 
economic risk for urban rail projects turn out to be substantially more expensive than 
said at the time of the decision to build (Flyvbjerg, 2007).   Again, we see Flyvbjerg’s 
strong  emphasis  on  assessment  and  management  of  risk  which  he  strongly  urges 






Using Flyvbjerg’s research, Table 5 Benchmarking of the California High Speed Rail, 
the numbers for the California high speed rail were recalculated to show the difference 
between the actual and the estimate, both in terms of cost and demand.  In terms of 
cost, there is an underestimate of $18 billion and ridership is overestimated by 5 million 
riders.  The numbers used to calculate the difference are found in Table 6 Flyvberg’s 
cost escalation and ridership for 12 urban rail projects.  
Table 5. Benchmarking of the California High Speed Rail  






Cost Escalation % 
(constant prices) 
$45 Billion  40%  $18 billion 
Ridership Shortfall 
% 
10 million per year 
(by 2020) 
-47.8  -$5 million 
 
 
Table 6.  Flyvberg’s cost escalation and ridership for 12 urban rail projects  







Costs  28/45/56  40.3  25.3 
Ridership  -67/-52/-34  -47.8  25.6 




The estimates derived from the private consultants studies show that the operation cost 
for aviation would be $65.7 million per year, in comparison the California high speed rail 
which would be $152.5 annually; this is based on 2003 dollars (CAHSRA, 2004).  The 
annual operations and maintenance costs of the high speed rail alternative is based on 76 
 
system  indicators,  including  operating  speed,  travel  time,  station  configuration, 
maintenance and storage facility, and operating schedule (CAHSRA, 2004).  Annual 
operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  costs  associated  with  aviation  are  based  on  the 
actual  O&M  costs  for  airports  in  each  region,  as  reported  in  their  annual  financial 
statements (CAHSRA, 2004).  
Table 7. Annual Operating Cost (Millions of 2003 Dollars) (Airports versus HSR) 
Modal  Air  CA HSR 
Operating Cost  $65.7  $152.5 
Source: California High Speed Rail Authority, 2004 
 
The question of what will happen if the California high speed rail authority fails to meet 
the basic operating costs has been avoided by the California high speed rail authority 
staff and leadership.   In Table 5 we see that the projected ridership is overestimated by 
$5  million  riders,  which  will  have  a  snowball  effect  in  all  the  rest  of  their  numbers, 
decreasing revenue by a large sum, including projected farebox revenue.  Operating 
cost as seen in Table 7 are substantial, almost triple the amount of air operations.  If the 
California high speed rail authority does not meet its projected quote of ridership, there 
will  be  a  deficit  amount  and  the  question  remains:  who  will  step  up  and  pay  the 
remainder amount of the operation cost?  Being that the California High Speed Rail 
Authority is a government branch of the California state government, we can assume 
that the cost of operations will fall on taxpayers.  If past experiences apply, specifically 
looking at Flyvbjerg’s articles then, how will the California high speed rail surpass the 
projected  shortcomings?  The  recommendations  that  follow  this  section  provide 
suggestions on how the California high speed rail might be able to minimize cost and 





The California High Speed Rail will be a success if other mass transit projects are also 
funded (i.e. light rail, subways, buses).  Downtown to downtown destination is a great 
concept, but one that also needs to invest in local mass transit options.  If people get off 
the high speed train and do not have other public transportation to get them to their 
destination,  then  high  speed  rail  will  not  have  as  much  impact.    Below  are 
recommendations  that  should  be  considered  for  the  first  phases  of  high  speed  rail 
segment from Anaheim to Los Angeles. 
 
  Rail improvements within the Orange County segment of the LOSSAN Corridor to 
create feeder trains to the high speed rail stations 
 
  Limit new tracks of high speed rail to Los Angeles – Bakersfield – San Francisco 
 
  Identify and nominate projects that focus on near-term job creation and passenger 
rail improvements 
 
  Multimodal transit needs to be expanded in all the train station and urban centers 
 
  A stronger education campaign and outreach to community residents on the benefits 
of creating a high speed train system 
 
  Create stronger partnerships with the regional transportation agencies, so they can 
help create community support for the project 
 
Throughout the California High Speed Rail Authority should also strategically prepare 
for future  implementation  of  high-speed  rail  service  and  connecting  conventional rail 
service. 78 
 
FUTURE OF HIGH SPEED RAIL 
 
 
The demand for high speed rail might not be apparent now, but it will be in the near 
future  as  air  and  highway  capacity  continues  to  be  exacerbated.  However,  it  is 
important to emphasize that high speed rail will not work if mass transit is not built as 
well  and  suburban  sprawl  is  limited  creating  denser  nodes  around  rail  stations.  
Europe’s high speed rail was not based on ridership projections but on policy.  Their 
high speed trains complement the rest of their mass transit.  Though our economy might 
be slow, it might help improve California’s economy by the job growth it will create.  
Federal grants will be extremely important to help finance high speed trains and to spur 
the state’s economy.  A recovering California economy is crucial for the high speed train 
project.  Once the economy recovers, it will be easier for California to sell bonds that will 
help finance the construction of the system.  A strong economy will likely attract a large 
number of private investors into the project.  Aside from funding the California High 
Speed Rail Authority will have to develop and foster strong partnerships with all the 
regional transportation agencies that can help disseminate information and gather key 
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FRA-Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors 
 
Corridor  Endpoint Cities  Miles  Top Speeds 
 
California     Sacramento-San Diego      680       ns 
Empire      New York-Buffalo 439 125 
Florida      Tampa-Orlando-Miami       356      120 
Gulf Coast     Houston-Atlanta with       1,022       110 
New Orleans-Mobile branch 
Keystone     Philadelphia-Pittsburgh      349       110 





St. Louis-Kansas City       283       90 
Indianapolis-Louisville       111      79 
New England     Portland-Boston-Montreal     489       110 
Northeast     Boston-Washington, DC     456       150 
Pacific Northwest   Eugene-Vancouver, BC       466       110 
South Central     San Antonio-Tulsa with      994       ns 
Dallas-Little Rock branch 
Southeast     Washington, DC-Atlanta-     874       110 
Macon with Richmond-Hampton 
Roads branch 
 
Source: “High-Speed Rail Corridor Designations,” Federal Railroad Administration, 2005, tinyurl.com/6s94zd. 
Note: ns = not specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 